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HUMOR	and	STYLISTICS		-		Simpson	and	Bousfield.	
		
Stylistics	is	a	tradition	of	research	that	explores	literature	using	the	models,	methods	and	techniques	
of	contemporary	linguistics.	The	underpinning	postulate	of	all	stylistic	research	is	that	literature	is	
creative	expression	in	discourse,	and	by	imputation,	that	frameworks	in	language	and	linguistics	are	
pre-eminently	well-suited	to	the	exploration	of	both	the	compositional	aspects	of	literature	and	the	
intersection	between	patterns	of	style	and	the	ways	in	which	readers	interact	with,	and	respond	to,	
these	patterns.	Enabled	by	the	whole	panoply	of	methods	in	linguistics,	a	stylistic	analysis	can	
stretch	from	detailed	investigation	of,	say,	phonetic	patterning	in	a	single	poem	to	a	large	scale,	
corpus-assisted	exploration	of	an	entire	movement	in	literary	history.		There	has	of	course	been,	
since	antiquity,	much	scholarly	and	philosophical	interest	in	the	latent	power	of	patterns	in	style	and	
language,	from	the	classical	Rhetoricians	(Cockcroft	and	Cockroft	2005),	through	the	Russian	
Formalist	movement	and	thence	to	the	Prague	School	Structuralists	(Cook	1994).	Yet	it	was	largely	in	
the	last	three	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	under	the	stimulus	of	new	and	ever	more	refined	
developments	in	linguistic	theory	and	analysis,	that	the	recognisably	contemporary	discipline	of	
stylistics	took	shape.	In	these	years,	numerous	academic	publications	appeared	where	the	unifying	
principle	was	that	primacy	of	place	be	assigned	to	the	language	of	literature.	Among	these	early	
outputs	were	general	book-length	treatments	by	Widdowson	(1975),	Cluysenaar	(1976),	Traugott	
and	Pratt	(1980),	Carter	(1982)	and	Fowler	(1986),	and	this	body	of	work	was	ably	supplemented	by	
more	specific	studies	on,	for	example,	poetry	(Leech	1969;	Verdonk	1993),	prose	(Leech	and	Short	
1981;	Toolan	1988)	and	drama	(Burton	1980;	Culpeper	et	al	1998).		
While	the	focus	of	such	analysis,	as	noted,	is	steadfastly	on	the	creative	expression	of	the	system	of	
language,	stylistics	has	never	sought	to	deny	other	approaches	to	understanding	literature,	and	nor	
has	it	sought	to	over-emphasise	the	formal	properties	of	a	text	at	the	expense	of	its	social	and	
cultural	context	of	production.	On	the	contrary,	stylistic	methods	are	frequently	enriched	and	
enabled	by	theories	of	discourse,	culture	and	society.	For	instance,	three	well-established	branches	
of	contemporary	stylistics	are	feminist	stylistics,	cognitive	stylistics	and	discourse	stylistics,	all	which	
have	been	sustained	by	insights	from,	respectively	(and	rather	obviously),	feminist	theory	(e.g.	Mills	
1995),	cognitive	psychology	(e.g.	Semino	and	Culpeper	2002)	and	discourse	analysis	(Carter	and	
Simpson	1989).	Furthermore,	creativity	and	innovation	in	language-use	have	never	been	cast	as	the	
exclusive	preserve	of	literary	writing.	Many	forms	of	discourse,	such	as	advertising,	journalism,	
popular	music	or	even	casual	conversation,	often	display	a	high	degree	of	stylistic	creativity,	such	
that	it	would	be	wrong	to	view	dexterity	in	language	use	as	exclusive	to	canonical	literature.	
Therefore,	in	the	analyses	which	follow	later,	examples	from	literary	discourse	are	situated	against	
the	wider	backdrop	of	different	genres	and	registers	of	language.	In	our	specific	case,	verbal	humor	
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and	linguistic	impoliteness,	which	form	the	core	of	our	sample	analysis,	are	tracked	and	interpreted	
through	examples	from	literary,	dramatic	and	so-called	‘telecinematic’	discourses.		
A	defining	characteristic	of	the	body	of	research	that	is	commonly	understood	to	be	‘stylistic’	is	that	
its	methods	of	analysis	should	be	sufficiently	transparent	as	to	allow	other	stylisticians	to	verify	
them,	either	by	testing	them	on	the	same	text	or	by	applying	them	beyond	that	text.	Thus,	the	
conclusions	and	interpretations	reached	are	principled	only	if	the	pathway	followed	by	the	analysis	
is	accessible	and	replicable.	It	is	this	aspect	of	stylistics	that	perhaps	more	than	any	other	sets	the	
discipline	in	counterpoint	to	approaches	to	literature	where	interpretation	comes	solely	from	
impressionistic	commentary	or	untested	(or	untestable)	intuition.		Unsurprisingly,	this	
methodological	standpoint	has	induced	much	interest,	in	stylistics,	in	the	expression	of	verbal	humor	
in	literature.	In	the	absence	of	robust	justification	within	a	framework	of	language	and	discourse,	it	
is	simply	not	enough	for	the	critic-analyst	to	decree	that	a	passage	of	writing	is	humorous;	nor	is	it	
enough	to	reiterate	a	received	wisdom	about	certain	genres	of	writing	being	‘comic’	or	to	assume	
that	all	readers	will	find	aspects	of	the	prose	style	of,	say,	Jane	Austen	or	Laurence	Sterne	inherently	
funny.	A	stylistic	perspective	on	verbal	humor	argues	that	while	linguistic	features	of	a	text	do	not	of	
themselves	constitute	a	text's	‘humor’,	an	account	of	linguistic	features	nonetheless	serves	to	
ground	the	stylistic	interpretation	and	explain	why,	for	the	analyst,	certain	types	of	humor	are	
possible.	
Two	key	theoretical	principles	underpin	the	stylistic	approach	to	the	analysis	of	humor.	In	line	with	
many	contributions	to	this	handbook,	the	first	principle	is	that	that	humor	requires	some	form	of	
stylistic	incongruity.	More	narrowly,	the	incongruity	can	be	engendered	by	any	kind	of	stylistic	twist	
in	a	pattern	of	language	or	any	situation	where	there	is	a	mismatch	between	what	is	asserted	and	
what	is	meant.	The	second	principle	is	that	the	incongruity	can	be	situated	in	any	layer	of	linguistic	
structure.	That	is	to	say,	the	humor	mechanism	can	operate	at	any	level	of	language	and	discourse,	
and,	as	we	shall	seek	to	demonstrate	in	our	sample	analyses,	it	can	even	play	off	one	level	off	
against	another.	A	large	part	of	the	stylistic	analysis	of	humor	therefore	involves	identifying	an	
incongruity	in	a	text	and	pinpointing	whereabouts	in	the	language	system	it	occurs.	Of	course,	not	all	
incongruities	are	funny	or	humorous,	and	some	of	the	issues	which	this	raises	for	stylistic	analysis	
are	explored	later	in	this	chapter	(see	also	Attardo	2001).	
Unsurprisingly,	one	of	the	most	commonly	used	stylistic	devices	for	creating	humor	in	literary	texts	is	
the	pun.	As	a	form	of	word-play	in	which	some	feature	of	linguistic	structure	simultaneously	
combines	two	unrelated	meanings,	many	puns	cut	across	different	levels	of	linguistic	organisation	
such	that	their	formal	properties	are	quite	variable.	Clearly,	the	pun	is	an	important	part	of	the	
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stylistic	arsenal	of	writers	because	it	allows	a	controlled	‘double	meaning’	to	be	located	in	what	is	in	
effect	a	chance	connection	between	two	elements	of	language.	Punning	in	literary	discourse	is	
illustrated	by	the	following	lines	from	the	fourth	book	of	Alexander	Pope’s	The	Dunciad	([1743],	
1986:	2292):		 	
	 	 Where	Bentley	late	tempestuous	wont	to	sport	 	 	 	 	
	 	 In	troubled	waters,	but	now	sleeps	in	port.	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Although	an	isolated	example	from	many	possibilities	in	literary	discourse,	the	couplet	does	
illustrate	well	the	basic	principle	of	punning.	The	form	port	embraces	two	lexical	items:	both	
obvious,	one	refers	to	a	harbour	and	the	other	an	alcoholic	beverage.	In	the	context	of	Pope’s	
couplet,	Bentley	(a	boisterous	Cambridge	critic)	is	described	through	a	nautical	metaphor,	as	
someone	who	has	crossed	turbulent	seas	to	reach	a	tranquil	safe-haven.	Yet	the	second	sense	of	
‘port’	makes	for	a	disjunctive	reading,	which,	suggesting	a	perhaps	drunken	sleep,	tends	to	undercut	
comically	the	travails	of	Bentley.	In	other	words,	the	double	treading	is	projected	by	balancing	two	
otherwise	unrelated	elements	of	linguistic	structure.	Staying	with	Alexander	Pope,	here	is	a	line	from	
the	second	Canto	of	Rape	of	the	Lock	([1714],	1986:	2233)	where	the	spirit	Ariel	seeks	to	protect	the	
poem’s	‘heroine’	Belinda.		Threatened	by	the	‘dire	disaster’	and	‘black	omens’	that	might	challenge	
her	otherwise	impeccable	appearance,	she	attempts	to	avoid	any	peril	that	might	
	 	 .	.	.	stain	her	honour,	or	her	new	brocade		
Here	the	rhetorical	device	of	zeugma	is	carried	by	a	single	governing	verb	that	conjoins	two	nouns:	
one	expressing	a	lofty	ideal	and	the	other,	rather	more	prosaically,	Belinda’s	new	embroidered	
garment.	This	technique	in	high	burlesque,	where	trivial	subject	matter	is	presented	in	an	ornate	or	
formalised	style,	is	also	at	work,	nearly	three	centuries	later,	in	the	opening	lines	of	Michael	
Longley’s	poem	‘Level	Pegging’:		
	 	 After	a	whole	day	shore	fishing	off	Allaran	point		 	 	 	
	 	 And	Tonkeera	you	brought	back	one	mackerel		 	 	 	 	
	 	 Which	I	cooked	with	reverence	and	mustard	sauce.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Longley	2004:	30)		
Again,	the	zeugma	is	expressed	through	the	conjoining	of	introspective	reflection	on	the	one	hand	
with	the	more	worldly	culinary	accompaniment	required	for	the	lone	mackerel.	Discussing	the	
semantics	of	coordinated	noun	phrases	like	these,	Attardo	invokes	the	concepts	of		‘script	
opposition’	and	the	‘logic	mechanism’	to	describe	the	way	text	processors	process	the	incongruity	of	
such	constructions.		Referring	to	simple,	playful	juxtapositions	like	‘strawberries	and	zeitgeist’	or	
‘asparagus	and	the	immortality	of	the	soul’,	Attardo	highlights	the	obvious	incongruity	derived	from	
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the	opposition	between	the	left	and	right	hand	sides	of	the	coordination,	suggesting	that	the	
resolution	works	on	the	assumption	that	since	the	two	NPs	occur	as	members	of	a	coordinating	
construction,	it	follows	that	they	are	equivalent	and	that	therefore	it	should	be	acceptable	to	equate	
them	(1997:	412).		
There	is	one	stylistic	feature	of	verbal	humor	that	in	some	respects	subsumes	both	the	rhetorical	
trope	of	zeugma	and	the	technique	in	pastiche	of	high	burlesque.	This	is	the	concept	of	register	
humor	(Attardo	1994:	230-253;	Alexander	1997:	190-192).	Whereas	a	dialect	is	a	variety	defined	
according	to	the	user	of	language,	a	register,	by	contrast,	is	a	variety	defined	according	to	the	use	to	
which	language	is	being	put.	In	other	words,	a	register	is	characterized	by	a	fixed	(and	recognizable)	
pattern	in	vocabulary	and	grammar;	a	cookery	recipe,	a	university	essay	in	physics	or	a	journalistic	
report	of	a	sporting	event	are	all	distinguishable	as	registers	because	of	the	function	these	forms	of	
discourse	are	required	to	carry	out.	Context,	so	most	theories	argue,	is	an	important	determinant	of	
register,	although	this	predictive	aspect	is	more	about	likelihood	or	general	tendencies	than	about	
absolutely	fixed	patterns	in	grammar	and	style.	Where	the	humor	mechanism	comes	into	play	is	
when,	as	Attardo	points	out	(1994:	239),	speakers	subvert	predictions	about	the	appropriateness	of	
certain	registers	in	context,	and	the	resulting	mismatches	lead	to	the	type	of	incongruity	we	
identified	early	on	as	being	at	the	heart	of	humor.	Simply	put,	specific	subject	matter	requires	
specific	terms,	but	there	is	great	comic	potential	in	the	mixing	of	these	levels,	styles	and	registers	
(Alexander	1997:	191).	
Simpson	(2014:	110-116)	examines	register	humor	in	a	passage	from	Irvine	Welsh’s	novel	
Trainspotting	(1993).	In	this	episode,	the	novel’s	first	person	narrator,	Renton,	finds	himself	in	a	
Magistrate’s	court	defending	a	charge	of	shoplifting,	having	stolen	books	to	support	his	heroin	
addiction.	Renton’s	utterances	in	front	of	the	court	are	sullen	and	monosyllabic,	and	are	couched	in	
the	low-status	Edinburgh	vernacular	that	permeates	the	bulk	of	the	novel	(‘Sell	fuckin	books.	Ma	
fuckin	erse’).	However,	when	the	Magistrate	facetiously	challenges	Renton	on	his	seeming	penchant	
for	the	philosopher	Kierkegaard	(the	author	of	one	of	the	stolen	books),	the	defendant	offers	this	
astonishing	riposte:		
	 	 --	So	you	read	Kierkegaard.	Tell	us	about	him,	Mr	Renton,	the	patronizing	cunt	sais.
	 	 --	I’m	interested	in	his	concepts	of	subjectivity	and	truth,	and	particularly	his	ideas	
	 	 concerning	choice;	the	notion	that	genuine	choice	is	made	out	of	doubt	and		
	 	 uncertainty,	and	without	recourse	to	the	advice	and	experience	of	others.	It	could	
	 	 be	argued,	with	some	justification,	that	it’s	primarily	a	bourgeois,	existential		
	 	 philosophy	.	.	.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Welsh	1993:	166)	
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Here,	the	switch	in	register,	from	a	non-standard	vernacular	infused	with	swear	words	and	taboo	
language	to	an	eloquent	academic	disquisition	on	moral	philosophy,	could	not	be	more	stark.	Yet	
this	suddenly	elevated	turn	of	phrase	does	more	than	simply	engender	comic	effect.	For	one	thing,	
the	Magistrate	is	taken	aback	by	the	erudition,	such	that	Renton	is	later	released;	for	another,	this	is	
a	knowing	authorial	gesture	to	the	reader	that	the	novel’s	seemingly	indolent	and	drug-addled	
narrator	is	a	more	formidable	intellectual	presence	in	the	story	than	he	first	appears.	
Other	stylistic	treatments	of	humor	in	literature	have	quite	naturally	focussed	on	parody	and	satire,	
forms	that	draw	on	a	particular	kind	of	irony	for	the	design	of	their	stylistic	incongruity	(Simpson	
2003).	In	very	basic	terms,	irony	is	situated	in	the	space	between	what	you	say	and	what	you	mean,	
as	embodied	in	an	utterance	like	‘You’re	a	fine	friend!’	when	said	to	someone	who	has	just	let	you	
down.	Additionally,	irony	may	be	engendered	by	the	echoing	of	other	utterances	and	forms	of	
discourse.	So	in	an	exchange	like	the	following	
	 	 A:	 I'm	really	fed	up	with	this	washing	up.	 	 	 	 	
	 	 B:	 You’re	fed	up!	Who	do	you	think’s	been	doing	it	all	week?	
the	proposition	about	being	‘fed	up’	is	used	in	a	non-ironic	way	by	the	first	speaker,	but	in	an	ironic	
way	by	the	second.	In	other	words,	the	status	of	the	proposition	when	echoed	by	speaker	B	lacks	the	
sincerity	of	when	it	is	used	for	the	first	time	by	speaker	A.	
This	principle	of	‘ironic	echo’	is	absolutely	central	to	the	concept	of	parody.	Once	echoed,	a	text	
becomes	part	of	a	new	discourse	context	so	it	no	longer	has	the	interpretative	status	it	once	had	in	
its	original	context	of	use.	Parody	can	take	any	particular	anterior	text	as	its	model,	as	well	as	
importing	more	general	characteristics	of	other	genres	of	discourse,	making	parody,	in	Nash’s	words,	
a	‘discourse	of	allusion’	(Nash	1985:		74-99).	For	instance,	Dorothy	Parker’s	poem	‘One	Perfect	Rose’	
(1923)	opens	with	a	knowingly	parodic	echo	of	the	lyric	love	poem	of	the	seventeenth	or	eighteenth	
century:	‘A	single	flow’r	he	sent	me,	since	we	met’.	The	last	of	the	poem’s	three	quatrains,	however,	
subverts	this	anachronistic	pattern	of	vocabulary	and	syntax	through	its	comical	expression	of	an	
altogether	more	contemporaneous	desire:	‘Why	is	it	no	one	ever	sent	me	yet	/	One	perfect	
limousine,	do	you	suppose?’.	
The	distinction	between	parody	and	satire	is	not	an	easy	one	to	draw,	but	it	is	commonly	assumed	
that	satire	has	an	aggressive	or	critical	element	that	is	not	necessarily	present	in	parody.	One	stylistic	
approach	to	satire	(Simpson	2003:	passim)	has	argued	that	satirical	discourse,	as	well	as	having	an	
echoic	element,	requires	a	further	kind	of	ironic	twist	or	distortion	in	its	textual	make-up.	This	
additional	distortion	means	that	while	parodies	can	remain	affectionate	to	their	source,	satire	can	
never	be	so.	Consider,	for	example,	Jonathan	Swift’s	famous	satirical	piece	‘A	Modest	Proposal’	
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(1729).	Swift’s	text	echoes	the	genre	of	the	early	eighteenth	century	pamphlet,	and	more	narrowly	
the	proliferation	of	pamphlets	offering	economic	solutions	to	what	was	then	perceived	as	the	‘Irish	
problem’.	The	opening	of	the	Proposal	reviews	various	schemes	and	recommendations	to	alleviate	
poverty	and	starvation,	but	it	is	only	after	about	nine	hundred	words	of	text	that	its	mild-mannered	
speaker	eventually	details	his	‘proposal’:		
	 I	shall	now	therefore	humbly	propose	my	own	thoughts,	which	I	hope	will	not	be	liable	to	
	 the	least	objection.	I	have	been	assured	by	a	very	knowing	American	of	my	acquaintance	in	
	 London,	that	a	young	healthy	child	well	nursed	is	at	a	year	old	a	most	delicious,	nourishing,	
	 and	wholesome	food,	whether	stewed,	roasted,	baked,	or	boiled;	and	I	make	no	doubt	that	
	 it	will	equally	serve	in	a	fricassee	or	a	ragout.	 	 (Swift	[1729],1986:	2175-6)	
	
While	Swift’s	‘proposal’	echoes	ironically	the	convention	of	a	particular	genre	of	discourse,	it	
simultaneously	distorts	this	convention	through	its	startling	suggestion	to	alleviate	the	burden	of	
overpopulation	in	Ireland	by	eating	that	country’s	children.	In	this	sense,	the	satire	is	created	
through	both	an	echo	of	another	discourse	and	a	stylistic	distortion	within	its	own	internal	
composition.	That	said,	a	question	remains	as	to	genuinely	how	‘humorous’	this	particular	brand	of	
satire	is,	a	point	that	will	taken	up	later.		
As	observed	in	the	introductory	part	of	this	chapter,	stylistic	approaches	to	humor	are	not	restricted	
by	the	type	of	linguistic	framework	employed	or	by	the	type	of	literary	genre	explored.	All	kinds	of	
suitable	models	may	be	pressed	into	service	depending	on	the	type	of	literary	text	under	scrutiny.	
For	instance,	Attardo	draws	on	models	in	cognitive	linguistics	for	his	cognitive-stylistic	analysis	of	
humour-inducing	strategies	in	prose	fiction	(Attardo	2002).	Focussing	on	Oscar	Wilde’s	Lord	Arthur	
Savile’s	Crime	(1891),	Attardo	applies	the	General	Theory	of	Verbal	Humor	to	the	short	story,	
differentiating	amongst	other	things	between	Wilde’s	use	of	punch	lines	and	jab	lines.	While	the	
former	category	indicates	the	occurrence	of	a	humour	device	at	the	end	of	the	text,	the	jab	line	
signals	a	humorous	occurrence	anywhere	else	in	the	text.	A	punch	line	(underlined)	closes	the	
following	quip	from	the	story:	
	 	 	 Do	you	believe	in	clubs	for	young	men?	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 Only	when	kindness	fails.	
Whereas	the	punch	line	inheres	in	a	simple	pun	around	the	lexeme	club,	a	rather	more	complex	
pattern	of	jab	lines	permeates	the	following	excerpt	from	the	story:	
	 	 .	.	.	at	the	end	of	the	picture	gallery	stood	the	Princess	Sophia	of	Carlsruhe,	a		
	 	 heavy	Tartar-looking	lady,	with	tiny	black	eyes	and	wonderful	emeralds,		
	 	 talking	bad	French	at	the	top	of	her	voice	.	.	.		 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 (after	Attardo	2002:	235;	emphasis	in	original)	 	
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Expanding	on	the	underlined	units	in	this	fragment	from	Wilde’s	text,	Attardo	argues	that	the	
lexeme	‘Princess’	activates	certain	stereotypical	predictions	about	the	direction	the	story	is	likely	to	
take.	However,	the	incongruity	is	delivered	through	the	non-stereotypically	princess-like	
characteristics	that	follow	(Attardo	2002:	235-6).	And,	of	course,	these	jab	lines	include	the	
coordinated	noun	phrases	‘tiny	back	eyes’	and	‘wonderful	emeralds’,	another	illustration	of	the	
rhetorical	trope	of	zeugma	covered	earlier.		
There	is	a	long	and	established	tradition	of	stylistic	research	on	the	pragmatic	characteristics	of	
dialogue,	whether	that	dialogue	is	realised	in	plays	(Burton	1980,	Culpeper	et	al	1998,	Mandala	
2007)	or	in	film	and	television	(Richardson	2010;	Piazza	2011).	In	the	sample	analyses	that	follow,	we	
intend	to	probe	further	issues	around	the	interconnections	between	humor	and	dialogue.		Although	
dramatic	dialogue	is	a	genre	of	discourse	that	has	been	consistently	and	much-favoured	in	stylistic	
research	over	the	years,	in	spite	of	some	notable	exceptions,	little	of	this	work	has	focussed	directly	
or	systematically	on	humor.	Furthermore,	and	echoing	the	position	stated	at	the	start	of	this	
chapter,	creativity	in	language-use	transcends	literature	such	that	the	analysis	of	fictional	dialogue,	
for	instance,	may	be	carried	out	both	on	literary	texts	or	on	the	kinds	of	dialogue	found	in	television	
and	film.	Selecting	the	pragmatics	of	impoliteness	has	its	preferred	model	of	analysis,	the	stylistic	
analysis	that	follows	embraces	forms	of	literary	and	non-literary	discourse	alike.	
Humor	and	Stylistics	meet	the	Linguistics	of	Impoliteness.	
The	concepts	of	humor	and	impoliteness	when	present	in	fiction,	drama,	and	even	real	life,	can	be	
natural	bedfellows.	From	the	irascibly	insulting	Doctor	House	in	House	MD,	and	the	creatively	
offensive	character	of	Malcolm	Tucker’s	spin	doctor	in	In	The	Thick	Of	It	and	In	The	Loop,	not	
forgetting	Tyrion	Lannister	in	A	Game	Of	Thrones	jocularly	‘confessing’	the	sins	of	his	early	life,	when	
first	accused	of	treason	and	murder	(see	below);	to	the	real-life,	albeit	edited	portrayals	of	chef-chef	
interactions	in	Boiling	Point,	Ramsay’s	Kitchen	Nightmares,	and	Hell’s	Kitchen;	to	Police-Public	
Encounters	in	Motorway	Life,	and	Raw	Blues,	the	sheer	popularity	of	these	shows	indicate	a	sure	
attraction	towards	and	fundamental	appetite	for	the	socially	disruptive	nature	of	what	has	been	
termed,	in	academic	circles,	as	rudeness,	aggression	and	impoliteness.	
In	each	case,	the	appearance	and	production	of	situations	representing	the	construction	and	
communication	of	impoliteness	essentially	indicates	a	break	from	the	norms	of	expectation	either	
within	the	text	world	created	(in	fiction,	and	drama),	or	within	real	life.	But	then,	the	same	is	true	of	
humour.	The	combination	of	both	impoliteness	and	humour,	therefore,	can	compound	the	effect.	
After	all,	one	often	crucial	aspect	of	humour,	is	that	of	incongruity.	Incongruent	humour	is	that	
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which	breaks	the	expected	or	schematic	norms	of	everyday	situations.	Ranging	from	the	
ridiculousness	of	pratfalls	and	slapstick	humour,	to	the	sublime	of	cunning	and	wilful	social	
transgressions	wrapped	up	in	the	linguistic	dexterity	of	an	able	character’s	verbal	humor.	The	main	
point	to	be	made	here	is	that	humour	is	similar,	in	the	respect	of	social	transgression,	at	least,	to	
impoliteness.		As	Mills	(2003)	argues,	impoliteness	is	a	break	from	the	norms	of	interactional	
expectation.	So,	too,	is	humour	through	the	approach	to	the	concept	known	as	incongruity	theory	
(see	Attardo	2001,	Vandaele	2002).	Impoliteness,	and	the	communication	of	linguistic	offence	is	
based	on	notions	of	power	and,	hence,	on	superiority	(See	Bousfield	and	Locher	2008);	but	then,	so	
too,	is	humour’s	superiority	theory	(see	Attardo	2001,	Vandaele	2002).	Finally	impoliteness	can	be	
constructed	and	communicated	as	a	means	of	socio-cognitive	relief	(see	Bousfield	2008)	from	
pressure,	stress	or	other	perceived	tension;	but	again	so	too	does	humour	have	its	relief	theory	(see	
Attardo	1994,	Spencer	1864).		
Within	the	remainder	of	this	analytic	section,	therefore,	we	explore	the	historical	perspectives	of	
both	‘verbal	humour’	and	‘linguistic	impoliteness’,	including	how	the	two	have	recently	come	to	be	
theorised	together	in	the	works	of	Culpeper	(2005),	Dynel	(2016)	and	Toddington	(2008).	Next,	we	
explore	core	issues	and	topics	in	the	analysis	of	humour	and	impoliteness,	exploring	the	role,	and	
impact	of	what	Lorenzo	Dus	(2009)	calls	the	‘double	articulation’	effect	of	most	TV	mediated	
productions,	which	would	include	dramatic	representations	of	impoliteness.	We	explore	
methodologies	for	analysis	of	humour	and	impoliteness,	and	provide	a	sample	analysis.	We	explore	
new	debates	in	both	impoliteness	theorising	and	humour	studies,	indicating	new	issues,	new	
challenges,	and	new	potential	ways	of	illuminating	stretches	of	discourse	involving	impoliteness	and	
humour	from	contemporary	linguistic	perspectives.	All	this,	however,	raises	the	question	of	how	the	
study	of	impoliteness,	and	the	study	of	humour	relate	to	stylistics.	
As	we	argued,	it	is	the	role	of	the	stylistician	to	show	the	mechanisms,	and	models	behind	the	verbal	
humour,	and,	in	this	case,	therefore,	behind	the	linguistic	impoliteness	to	show	how	the	attempt	at	
humour	(or	at	impoliteness,	or	both)	has	been	made.	To	this	end,	we	now	explore	the	models	and	
theories	of	impoliteness.	
	
In	defining	impoliteness	we	may	turn	to	any	of	the	following.	Bousfield	(2010)	has	argued	that,	
	
Impoliteness	 constitutes	 the	 issuing	 of	 intentionally	 gratuitous	 and	 conflictive	 face-
threatening	acts	that	are	purposefully	performed	either:	
(i) unmitigated		in	contexts	where	mitigation	(i.e.	politeness)	is	required		
and/or	
(ii) with	deliberate	 aggression,	 that	 is,	with	 the	 face	 threat	 exacerbated,	 ‘boosted’,	 or	
maximized	in	some	way	to	heighten	the	face	damage	inflicted.		
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Furthermore,	for	impoliteness	to	be	considered	successful	impoliteness,	the	intention	of	the	
speaker	(or	‘author’)	to	‘offend’	(threaten/damage	face)	must	be	understood	by	someone	in	
a	receiver	role.	
(Bousfield	2010:	112).		
	
The	lowest	common	denominator	in	the	definitions	of	impoliteness	is	a	(set	of)	behaviour(s)	that	is	
face-aggravating	in	a	particular	context	(Locher	and	Bousfield	2008).	Culpeper	(2011:	23)	suggests	
that	impoliteness	“…is	a	negative	attitude	towards	specific	behaviors	occurring	in	specific	contexts.	It	
is	sustained	by	expectations,	desires	and/or	beliefs	about	social	organization,	including,	in	particular,	
how	one	person’s	or	group’s	identities	are	mediated	by	others	in	interaction.	Situated	behaviours	
are	viewed	negatively	–	considered	‘impolite’	–	when	they	conflict	with	how	one	expects	them	to	be,	
how	one	wants	them	to	be	and/or	how	one	thinks	they	ought	to	be”.	Culpeper’s	approach,	here,	is	
crucial	for	our	analyses	in	examples	[1]	and	[2]	below.	
Impoliteness,	however,	has	been	described,	somewhat	contentiously,	as	being	‘parasitic’	on	
politeness	(Culpeper	1996).	Culpeper’s	observation	operates	along	multiple	axes,	two	of	which	are	
pertinent	here:	impoliteness	as	a	parasitic	concept,	and	impoliteness	as	a	parasitic	model	for	
analysis.	In	terms	of	impoliteness	as	a	parasitic	concept:	Locher	and	Watts	(2008)	have	argued	that	
Politeness	not	Impoliteness	(or	“Rudeness”	as	they	label	the	concept	we,	here,	understand	as	
“impoliteness”;	see	also	Terkourafi	2008,	though	cf.	Bousfield	2008,	and	Culpeper	2005,	2011)	is	the	
unmarked,	or	expected,	default	“norm”	in	and	across	human-human	interactions,	all	other	things	
being	equal.	Hence,	as	Mills	(2003)	argues,	impoliteness	is	a	transgression,	or	break	from	the	
schematically	expected	norms	of	politeness.	Hence	impoliteness	is,	as	a	human	concept,	parasitic	on	
the	“default”	understanding	and	expectation	of	human-human	interaction	of	politeness.	In	terms	of	
impoliteness	as	a	parasitic	approach	or	model	of	analysis:	Historically,	the	most	prevalent	and	
broadly	applied	models	of	impoliteness	are	those	which	are	derived	–	parasitically	-	from	the	classic	
model	of	politeness	espoused	by	Brown	and	Levinson	(1987)	which	draws	upon	Goffman’s	notion	of	
face.	
The	 term	 face	may	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 positive	 social	 value	 a	 person	 effectively	 claims	 for	
himself	by	the	line	others	assume	he	is	taking	during	a	particular	contact.	
(Goffman	1967:	5)	
Brown	and	Levinson	argue	that	every	individual	in	a	society	has	two	aspects	of	Goffmanian	face,	
being:	
Positive	face:	An	individual’s	desire	to	be	liked	and	for	his	or	her	actions	to	be	approved	of.	
Negative	face:	An	individual’s	desire	to	be	unimpeded	in	his	or	her	actions.	
Brown	and	Levinson	(1987:	17-18)	
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They	further	argue	that	every	communication	between	two	or	more	individuals	has	the	potential	to	
impact	upon,	or	threaten	one	(or,	we	can	say,	both)	aspect	of	face.	These,	they	(ibid)	term	as	face-
threatening	acts	(FTAs).	These	threats	to	face	are	unavoidable	for,	as	Scollon	and	Scollon	(2001)	
argue	there	can	be	no	communication	without	face.	
The	key,	therefore,	contend	Brown	and	Levinson	(1987),	is	to	find	a	form	of	words	through	which	
any	FTA	can	be	mitigated:	the	threat	obviated,	or	reduced;	the	damage	done,	lessened	or	atoned	
for.	This	is	done	by	choosing	a	form	of	words	attending	to	one’s	interlocutors’	face	wants	or	needs.	
This	can	be	done	by	using	linguistic	politeness	which	attends	to	either	the	hearer’s	(or	receiver’s)	
positive	face	needs	(the	desire	to	be	approved	of)	or	negative	face	needs	(the	desire	to	be	
unimpeded).	For	example	thanking	someone	for	a	gift	attends	to	the	gift	giver’s	positive	face	needs	
(to	be	approved	of:	for	providing	the	gift);	whereas	apologising	for	accidentally	knocking	into	
someone	ameliorates	the	threat	to	the	offended	person’s	negative	face	(the	desire	to	be	
unimpeded:	by	being	knocked	around	during	the	normal	course	of	their	movements	of	the	day).	As	
fiction,	including	prose	and	drama,	exist	primarily	to	comment	on	the	human	condition,	and	
(re)present	situations	and	settings	in	life	in	a	foregrounded	way;	it	stands	to	reason	that	characters	
which	are	human,	or	human-like	can	be	expected	(unless	there	are	signals	to	the	contrary	within	the	
text)	to	have	the	same	identical,	or	similar	face	needs	to	humans	in	real-life	–	otherwise	fictional	
characters’	own	inevitable	struggles	with	life,	society	or	the	environment	would	have	little	meaning	
or	resonance	for	us	as	consumers	of	literature	beyond	being	an	autonomous	artefact	or	even	mere	
abstract	object	d’art.	
Where	this	becomes	particularly	relevant	for	us	in	our	theses	in	this	chapter	is	when	characters	
engage	in,	are	faced	with,	or	respond	to	impoliteness.	In	almost	direct	contrast	to	politeness,	
impoliteness	is	where	individuals,	or,	in	the	case	of	literary	stylistics,	characters	engage	in	attacking	
or	exacerbating	the	threats	to	the	face(s)	of	others	–	as	per	the	definitions	provided	above	for	
impoliteness	-	rather	than	mitigating	those	threats	to	face,	as	in	politeness.		
An	 example	 of	 a	 character	 responding	 to	 threats	 to	 her	 own	 face,	with	 intentional	 threats	 to	 her	
interlocutor’s	can	be	found	in	Jane	Austen’s	Pride	and	Prejudice	([1813],	2003).	
[1a]	In	this	scene	Darcy	has	arrived	to	propose	to	Elizabeth	Bennett	(a	main	character	through	whom	
much	of	the	third	person	narrative	is	focalised).	This	proposal	of	marriage	is	shortly	after	he	has	
worked	furiously	to	ensure	his	friend	Charles	Bingley	does	not	marry	Elizabeth’s	sister,	Jane	Bennett,	
adjudging	–	in	his	prejudice	–	that	the	Bennett	family	is	‘beneath’	that	of	Charles	Bingley.	Darcy	is	
evidently	agitated	as	he	arrives	as,	it	transpires,	he	is	struggling	to	reconcile	his	love	of	Elizabeth	with	
her	relatively	lower	social	status	compared	to	his	own.	Despite	her	own	emerging	feelings,	Elizabeth	
nurses	a	dislike	of	Darcy’s	haughty	pride,	and	adherence	to	class-based	distinctions.	All	this	results	in	
an	incongruent	proposal	and	response	indeed:	
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He	 sat	 down	 for	 a	 few	 moments,	 and	 then	 getting	 up,	 walked	 about	 the	 room.	
Elizabeth	was	surprised,	but	said	not	a	word.	After	a	silence	of	several	minutes,	he	
[Mr	Darcy]	came	towards	her	in	an	agitated	manner,	and	thus	began,	
	
“In	vain	have	I	struggled.	It	will	not	do.	My	feelings	will	not	be	repressed.	You	must	
allow	me	to	tell	you	how	ardently	I	admire	and	love	you.'”	
	
Elizabeth's	astonishment	was	beyond	expression.	She	stared,	coloured,	doubted,	and	
was	silent.	This	he	considered	sufficient	encouragement,	and	the	avowal	of	all	that	he	
felt	and	had	 long	felt	 for	her	 immediately	 followed.	He	spoke	well,	but	there	were	
feelings	besides	those	of	the	heart	to	be	detailed,	and	he	was	not	more	eloquent	on	
the	subject	of	tenderness	than	of	pride.	His	sense	of	her	 inferiority	--	of	 its	being	a	
degradation	 --	 of	 the	 family	 obstacles	 which	 judgment	 had	 always	 opposed	 to	
inclination,	were	dwelt	on	with	a	warmth	which	seemed	due	to	the	consequence	he	
was	wounding,	but	was	very	unlikely	to	recommend	his	suit.	
	
In	spite	of	her	deeply-rooted	dislike,	she	could	not	be	insensible	to	the	compliment	of	
such	a	man's	affection,	and	though	her	intentions	did	not	vary	for	an	instant,	she	was	
at	 first	 sorry	 for	 the	 pain	 he	 was	 to	 receive;	 till,	 roused	 to	 resentment	 by	 his	
subsequent	 language,	 she	 lost	 all	 compassion	 in	 anger.	 She	 tried,	 however,	 to	
compose	 herself	 to	 answer	 him	 with	 patience,	 when	 he	 should	 have	 done.	 He	
concluded	with	representing	to	her	the	strength	of	that	attachment	which,	in	spite	of	
all	his	endeavours,	he	had	found	impossible	to	conquer;	and	with	expressing	his	hope	
that	 it	would	now	be	rewarded	by	her	acceptance	of	his	hand.	As	he	said	this,	she	
could	easily	see	that	he	had	no	doubt	of	a	favourable	answer.		
	
Whilst	Elizabeth’s	surprise,	and	Darcy’s	conflict	within	himself	are	readily	evident,	what	is	of	
particular	note,	here,	is	the	fact	that	Darcy’s	speech	after	his	admission	of	love,	and	incorporating	his	
actual	proposal,	is	represented	as	Indirect	Speech	(see	Leech	and	Short	1981).	The	back-shifted	
tense,	and	the	use	of	third	person	pronouns	clearly	indicates	this	to	be	the	case	here:	He	concluded	
with	representing	to	her	the	strength	of	that	attachment	which,	in	spite	of	all	his	endeavours,	he	had	
found	impossible	to	conquer;	and	with	expressing	his	hope	that	it	would	now	be	rewarded	by	her	
acceptance	of	his	hand.	As	Leech	and	Short	have	argued	(ibid)	the	use	of	indirect	speech	as	well	as	
the	use	of	Narrator’s	Representation	of	Speech	Act	evident	in	in	spite	of	all	his	endeavours,	produces	
a	distancing	effect	on	the	reader.	As	this	is	focalised	through	Elizabeth	we	may	well	take	this	to	
mean	she	is	lost	in	her	astonishment	as	depicted	in	the	preceding	paragraph.	Equally	though,	the	
indirectness	of	the	way	Darcy’s	speech	is	presented	represents	the	off-handed	way	in	which	he	
describes	his	inner	conflict	between	love,	and	position.	This	adds	to	Elizabeth’s,	and	our	sense	of	
affront	at	the	threat	to	Elizabeth’s	positive	face	(desire	to	be	approved	of)	when	faced	(Darcy’s	
compliments	aside)	with	his	rather	distant	and	off-handed	comments	regarding	her	social	rank	and	
class	being	inferior	to	his	own.	We	argue	that	this	adds	to	our	sense	of	affront	as	our	access	to	the	
narrative	is	focalised	through	Elizabeth,	meaning	we	share	her	emotional	origo.	What	we	mean	here	
is	that,	given	the	locus,	or	centre	of	the	narrative	chapter’s	point	of	view	is	told	from	Elizabeth’s	
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perspective	we	share	the	temporal,	spatial	and,	as	we	are	experiencing	the	narrative	with	her,	
aspects	of	her	emotional	point	of	view.	What	she	sees,	hears	and	feels,	we	get	a	sense	of,	certainly	
more	than	that	of	any	other	character	at	this	point	in	the	narrative.	Hence,	when	she	has	her	aspects	
of	face	threatened,	we	can	understand	and	appreciate	it	more	keenly,	precisely	because	we	share	
her	origo.		
	
Indeed,	it	is	this	feeling	of	threat	to	positive	face	that	leads	Elizabeth	to	response	with	her	own,	this	
time,	intentional	threats	to	Darcy’s	face	in	a	way	which	the	reader	may	find	not	only	humorous,	but	
given	the	reasons	for	her	impolite	response,	cathartic;	and	of	lending	itself	towards	an	
understanding	of	the	psychological	release	that	impoliteness	(and	indeed	humor)	in	certain	
circumstances	can	provide,	as	we	see	in	the	immediately	following	extract:	
	
‘[1b]	This	extract	continues	immediately	after	the	above	in	[1a]:	
	
He	spoke	of	apprehension	and	anxiety,	but	his	countenance	expressed	real	security.	
Such	a	circumstance	could	only	exasperate	farther,	and	when	he	ceased,	the	colour	
rose	into	her	[Elizabeth’s]	cheeks,	and	she	said,	
	
“In	 such	 cases	 as	 this,	 it	 is,	 I	 believe,	 the	 established	mode	 to	 express	 a	 sense	 of	
obligation	for	the	sentiments	avowed,	however	unequally	they	may	be	returned.	It	is	
natural	that	obligation	should	be	felt,	and	if	I	could	feel	gratitude,	I	would	now	thank	
you.	But	I	cannot	--	I	have	never	desired	your	good	opinion,	and	you	have	certainly	
bestowed	it	most	unwillingly.	I	am	sorry	to	have	occasioned	pain	to	any	one.	It	has	
been	most	unconsciously	done,	however,	and	I	hope	will	be	of	short	duration.	The	
feelings	which,	you	tell	me,	have	long	prevented	the	acknowledgment	of	your	regard,	
can	have	little	difficulty	in	overcoming	it	after	this	explanation.”	
	
Mr.	Darcy,	who	was	leaning	against	the	mantle-piece	with	his	eyes	fixed	on	her	face,	
seemed	to	catch	her	words	with	no	 less	 resentment	 than	surprise.	His	complexion	
became	pale	with	anger,	and	the	disturbance	of	his	mind	was	visible	in	every	feature.	
He	was	struggling	for	the	appearance	of	composure,	and	would	not	open	his	lips,	till	
he	believed	himself	to	have	attained	it.	The	pause	was	to	Elizabeth's	feelings	dreadful.	
At	length,	in	a	voice	of	forced	calmness,	he	said,	
	
“And	this	is	all	the	reply	which	I	am	to	have	the	honour	of	expecting!	I	might,	perhaps,	
wish	to	be	informed	why,	with	so	little	endeavour	at	civility,	I	am	thus	rejected.	But	it	
is	of	small	importance.”	
	
“I	might	as	well	enquire,”	replied	she,	“why,	with	so	evident	a	design	of	offending	and	
insulting	me,	you	chose	to	tell	me	that	you	liked	me	against	your	will,	against	your	
reason,	and	even	against	your	character?	Was	not	this	some	excuse	for	incivility,	if	I	
was	uncivil?	But	I	have	other	provocations.	You	know	I	have.	Had	not	my	own	feelings	
decided	against	you,	had	they	been	indifferent,	or	had	they	even	been	favourable,	do	
you	think	that	any	consideration	would	tempt	me	to	accept	the	man,	who	has	been	
the	means	of	ruining,	perhaps	for	ever,	the	happiness	of	a	most	beloved	sister?”	
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In	the	fifth	paragraph	of	extract	[1b]	here,	despite	the	very	formal,	structural	properties	of	their	
words,	the	function	of	Elizabeth’s	criticisms	of	Mr	Darcy	is	to	clearly,	via	Direct	Speech	
representation,	present	her	withering	face	attack	on	him	in	retaliation	for	his	own	insults	towards	
her.	Her	comments	of	‘why,	with	so	evident	a	design	of	offending	and	insulting	me,	you	chose	to	tell	
me	that	you	liked	me	against	your	will,	against	your	reason,	and	even	against	your	character?	Was	
not	this	some	excuse	for	incivility,	if	I	was	uncivil?’	represent	attacks	to	his	positive	face	(his	desire	to	
be	approved	of)	as	she	is	clearly	and	intentionally	reproving	him	for	his	earlier,	off-handed	and	
distant	remarks.	Further,	her	following	comments,	“But	I	have	other	provocations.	You	know	I	have.	
Had	not	my	own	feelings	decided	against	you,	had	they	been	indifferent,	or	had	they	even	been	
favourable,	do	you	think	that	any	consideration	would	tempt	me	to	accept	the	man,	who	has	been	
the	means	of	ruining,	perhaps	for	ever,	the	happiness	of	a	most	beloved	sister?”	further	reprove	him	
constituting	another	impolite-functioning	positive	face	attack.	This	also	clearly	limits	his	negative	
face	(his	desire	to	be	unimpeded)	by	clearly	outlining,	in	a	damaging	way,	he	will	not	get	what	he	
desires,	precisely	because	he	has	denied	those	desires.	It	is	evident	that	her	comments	have	hit	
home	in	[1c]:	
	
[1c]	
	
As	she	pronounced	these	words,	Mr.	Darcy	changed	colour;	but	the	emotion	was	
short,	and	he	listened	without	attempting	to	interrupt	her		
	
His	colour	change	appears	to	demonstrate	not	only	has	she	attempted	a	face	attack,	she	has	
succeeded	in	impoliteness	given	the	definition	we	adopt,	above.	Indeed	all	in	all	these,	and	other	
instances	within	this	extract	of	Elizabeth’s	skilful	destruction	of	Darcy’s	aspects	of	face	constitute	a	
more	global	attack	from	which	he	ultimately	withdraws,	as	evident	in	[1d]:	
	
[1d]	
And	with	these	words	he	hastily	left	the	room,	and	Elizabeth	heard	him	the	next	
moment	open	the	front	door	and	quit	the	house.	
	
	
(Austen,	Jane	[1813]	2003	Volume	2,	Chapter	11,	pp.	154-155,	157).	
	
	
Given	Elizabeth’s	skilful	handling	of	Darcy’s	off-handed	offence	when	proposing	to	her,	and	given	
that	we	are	clearly	focalised	through	her	–	thereby	sharing	aspects	of	her	spatial,	temporal	and	
emotional	origo	–	we	are	likely	to	find	her	behaviour	humorous,	or	at	the	very	least	psychologically	
satisfying	(cf.	relief	theory	mentioned	above)	at	having	seen	her	take	him	down	a	proverbial	peg	or	
two.	It	clearly	marks	her	character	out	as	well-rounded,	fearless,	controlled,	and	strong-minded.	
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Heady	traits	given	the	18th	century	period,	and	the	society	depicted	in	Pride	and	Prejudice,	and	the	
assumed	role	and	nature	of	women	within	the	same.	This	link	between	the	communication	and	
construction	of	impoliteness	and	of	humor	in	characterisation	is	not	limited	to	Austen’s	prose,	nor	
even	to	fictional	narrative.	Note	the	following	extract	in	which	the	character	of	Tyrion	Lannister	in	
the	dramatic	adaptation	of	A	Game	Of	Thrones	moves	from	just	another	point	of	view	character,	to	
main	protagonist,	purely	through	his	skilful,	and	exceptionally	humorous	use	of	impolite	language.	
	
[2]	TYRION	LANNISTER	a	nobleman,	born	with	dwarfism,	has	been	captured	and	put	on	trial	for	the	
murder	 of	 Jon	Arryn,	 and	 the	 attempted	murder	 of	 Brandon	 Stark.	 Crimes	 for	which	 he	 is	 entirely	
innocent	(other	members	of	House	Lannister	were	guilty	of	the	crimes	for	which	Tyrion	is	on	trial).	He	
has	spent	an	uncomfortable	night	 in	LYSSA	ARRYN’S	“sky	cells”	–	cells	with	a	sloping	floor	and	only	
three	walls	–	where	the	fourth	wall	should	be	there	 is	only	sky	and	a	three	hundred	foot	fall	to	the	
valley	floor.	Having	woken	up	dangling	over	the	edge	of	his	sky	cell,	and	fearing	he	will	not	survive	
another	night	TYRION	has	bribed	MORD,	the	jailer	to	take	him	to	LYSSA	ARRYN,	Lady	of	the	Vale,	and	
her	sickly,	overcoddled,	weak-minded	10	year	old	son,	ROBERT	in	order	to	apparently	confess.	TYRION	
claims	he	wishes	 to	 confess	 his	 crimes	 to	 the	assembled	 LORDS	and	 LADIES	of	 the	Vale	 –	 this	 is	 a	
calculated	move	of	Tyrion’s	to	escape	his	cell.	The	crimes	to	which	he	is	confessing	are	not	the	ones	his	
captors	 LYSSA	 ARRYN	 and	 CATELYN	 STARK,	 wife	 of	 Jon	 Arryn,	 and	 mother	 of	 Brandon	 Stark,	
respectively,	were	expecting	to	hear	-	much	to	the	amusement	of	the	LORDS	and	LADIES	of	the	Vale	
(and	the	TV	viewing	audience),	but	much	to	the	apparent	offense	of	LYSSA	and	CATELYN.	
	
1. LYSSA:	 	 You	wish	to	confess	your	crimes?	
2. TYRION:	 Yes,	milady.	I	do,	milady.	
3. LYSSA:		 	 (to	CATELYN)	The	skycells	always	break	them.	(To	TYRION)	Speak,	Imp!	And		
meet	your	gods	as	an	honest	man.	
4. TYRION:	 Where	do	I	begin?	I’m	a	vile	man.	I	confess	it.	My	crimes	and	sins	are	beyond	
counting.	I’ve	lied	and	cheated,	gambled	and	whored.	I’m	not	particularly	
good	at	violence,	but	I	am	good	at	convincing	others	to	do	violence	for	me.	
You	want	specifics,	I	suppose?	When	I	was	seven	I	saw	a	maid,	bathing	in	a	
river.	I	stole	her	robe.	She	was	forced	to	return	to	the	castle,	naked	and	in	
tears.	If	I	close	my	eyes,	I	can	still	see	her	tits	bouncing…	
	
The	assembled	LORDS	and	LADIES	of	 the	Vale	gasp	collectively.	Some	smile	and	 laugh.	Lyssa	Arryn	
looks	around	the	court,	unsure	as	to	their	response.	
	
5. TYRION:	 …	when	I	was	10	I	stuffed	my	uncle’s	boots	with	goat	shit.	When	confronted		
with	my	crime	I	blamed	the	squire.	Poor	boy	was	flogged.	I	escaped	justice.		
When	I	was	twelve,	I	milked	my	eel	into	a	pot	of	turtle	stew.	I	flogged	the		
one-eyed	snake,	I	skinned	my	sausage	(TYRION	is	miming	masturbatory		
motions	with	his	hands)	I	made	the	bald	man	cry	into	the	turtle	stew.	Which		
I	do	believe	my	sister	ate.	At	least,	I	hope	she	did…	
	
There	is	growing	laughter	around	the	courtroom	from	the	LORDS	and	LADIES	of	the	Vale.	
	
6. TYRION:	 …	I	once	brought	a	jackass	and	a	honeycomb	into	a	brothel	-	
7. LYSSA:	 	 (Standing	up	suddenly)	SILENCE!	
8. ROBERT:	 (Leaning	forward.	To	TYRION)	What	happened	next?	
9. LYSSA:		 	 What	do	you	think	you’re	doing?	
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10. TYRION:	 (puzzled)	Confessing	my	crimes!	
11. CATELYN:	 Lord	Tyrion,	you	are	accused	of	hiring	a	man	to	slay	my	son,	Bran,	in	his	bed.		
And	of	conspiring	to	murder	my	sister’s	husband,	Lord	Jon	Arryn,	The	Hand	
of	the	King.	
12. TYRION:	 I’m	very	sorry,	I	don’t	know	anything	about	all	that.	
13. LYSSA:	 	 You’ve	had	your	little	joke.	I	trust	you	enjoyed	it.	Mord!	Take	him	back	to		
the	dungeon.	This	time	in	a	smaller	cell,	with	a	steeper	floor!	
	
[…]		
(Espenson,	Benioff	and	Weiss	(2011).	A	Golden	Crown,	A	Game	of	Thrones,	Season	1,	Episode	6)	
	
	
This	extract	is	replete	with	impoliteness.	Some	direct	and	evidently	intentional,	other	parts	indirect,	
and	less	evidently	intentional	at	the	level	of	character	to	character	discourse.	Despite	Tyrion’s	
apparent	politeness	in	turn	2.	Where	he	calls	his	social	equal,	“milady”	this	is	a	give	deference	
positive	politeness	marker	(Brown	and	Levinson	1987)	one	which,	incidentally,	Lyssa	denies	Tyrion	in	
return.	Indeed,	we	see	explicit	impoliteness	begin	from	turn	3	with	Lyssa’s	calling	Tyrion,	“Imp!”.	
This	is	a	combination	of	the	‘call	the	hearer	names’,	and	the	‘use	inappropriate	identity	markers’	
linguistic	output	strategies	for	impoliteness	(see	Culpeper	1996),	which,	together,	constitute	a	
positive	face	attack	through	an	insulting	reference	to	Tyrion’s	dwarfism.	Within	the	same	turn	she	
further	communicates	the	impolite	albeit	implied	threat	(Culpeper	1996)	to	kill	him	with	“and	meet	
your	gods	as	an	honest	man”	This	being	an	extreme	threat	to	Tyrion’s	negative	face	as	she	is	
intending	to	end	and	impose	on	his	presumed	desire	to	stay	alive.	So	far,	the	impoliteness	she	
communicates,	whilst	evidence	of	power	role	assumptions	she	has	as	his	judge	and	sole	juror,	is	not	
at	this	stage	humorous.	Tyrion’s	indirect	face-attacks	on	Lyssa,	and	Catelyn,	begin	with	his	apparent	
confessions	in	turn	4	onwards,	and	this	is	where	the	humor	begins.	
Tyrion’s	apparent	self-face-damaging	admission	that	he	is	a	‘vile	man’	and	his	‘sins	are	beyond	
counting’	appear	to	damage	his	own	sense	of	seeking	approval	(his	own	positive	face)	especially	
when	he	admits	to	lying,	cheating,	gambling	and	whoring.	However,	the	first	specific	“sin”	he	
confesses	to,	from	when	he	was	seven	years	of	age,	is	little	more	than	childlike	mischief.	His	use	of	
the	taboo	word	“tits”,	and	the	later	“shit”,	is	highly	incongruent	with	that	of	either	a	noble	of	high	
birth,	or	a	genuine,	remorseful	confession.	In	fact,		Tyrion’s	introduction	of	the	lexical	items,	'tits'	
and	'goatshit'	arguably	comprise	representations	of	register	humor	(see	above)	insofar	as	they	
clearly	do	not	belong	in	the	confession	of	crimes	by	a	nobleman	of	high	birth	and	standing.	
Furthermore,	the	use	of	this	incongruent	lexical	token	appears	to	be	the	trigger	for	at	first	
astonishment,	and	then	some	scattered	laughter	in	the	assembled	court,	but	also	apparent	and	
eventually	evident	rising	offence	that	Lyssa	takes.	She	takes	this	precisely	as	Culpeper	2011	
predicted,	given	the	use	of	such	taboo	and	hence	incongruent	words,	as	their	use	is	not	how	one	
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expects	or	thinks	behaviour	in	a	confession	ought	to	be.	Their	use,	whilst	obviously	incongruent,	
contribute	to	an	undercurrent	of	power-challenge	which	Tyrion	is	so	skilful	at	producing.	
	
Continuing	with	his	confession	Tyrion’s	admission	of	having	another	person	punished	for	his	crime	of	
putting	goat’s	faeces	in	his	uncle’s	footwear	is	followed	by	the	incongruous	and	repeated	(through	
elegant	variation)	admission	that	he	masturbated	into	food	(I	milked	my	eel	into	a	pot	of	turtle	stew.	
I	flogged	the	one-eyed	snake,	I	skinned	my	sausage	I	made	the	bald	man	cry	into	the	turtle	stew)	
which	his	sister	(whom	he	hates)	then	ate.	There	are	multiple	points	to	make	here	in	support	of	the	
argument	being	made.	First,	the	sheer	repetition	of	his	admission	of	masturbating,	using	different	
metaphors	as	a	way	of	elegantly	varying	the	point	he	is	making	is	doubly	foregrounded.	The	
repetition	of	the	propositional	content	is	one	aspect	of	foregrounding,	which	is,	by	definition,	
incongruent;	and	the	use	of	such	metaphors,	when	literal	language	would	have	sufficed,	is	yet	
another	instance	of	foregrounding,	and	hence,	again,	incongruity.	Indeed,	the	sheer	confluence	of	
foregrounding/incongruity	in	the	self-effacing	admission	of	‘guilt’	contributes	to	the	generation	of	
humor	for	the	text-world’s	audience	and	the	TV	viewing	audience;	as,	indeed,	does	the	fact	that	in	
turn	7,	Lyssa	shouts	for	Tyrion	to	stop	–	evidently	offended	by	the	confession	taking	a	turn	which	she	
did	not	expect,	or	anticipate	(remember	her	satisfying	comment	to	her	sister,	Catelyn	‘The	sky	cells	
always	break	them’	at	the	start	of	the	scene.	This	directive	for	Tyrion	to	‘STOP!’	appears	to	show	she	
has	not	anticipated	his	type	of	confession,	and	the	incongruity	therein	challenges	her	position,	
power,	and	hence	her	aspects	of	negative	and	positive	face.	Negative	face,	as	her	authority	to	put	
Tyrion	to	death	as	she	desires	is	being	limited	by	his	non	confessing	to	crimes	requiring	a	death	
penalty;	and	positive	face,	as	he	is	evidently	not	taking	the	confession	Activity	Type	(Levinson	1979)	
seriously.		
	
Lyssa’s	directive	demand	for	him	to	stop	threatens	both	Tyrion’s	positive	face	–	by	showing	she	does	
not	approve	of	his	“confession”	and	his	negative	face	–	by	forcing	him	to	stop	and	not	continue	with	
his	incongruent,	and	increasingly	funny	‘confessions’.	Indeed,	evidence	in	turn	8	suggests	Robert’s	
interrogative	means	he	wants	Tyrion	to	continue.	However,	with	Lyssa’s	turn	9	–	where	she	
demands	Tyrion	to	explain	his	linguistic	behaviour	to	that	point,	it	is	now	evident	that	she	is	
offended	by	his	style	and	content	of	admission	and	confessions.	That	offence	has	been	taken,	by	
Lyssa,	appears	further	evident	in	her	turn	13	where	she	criticises	him	for	his	“little	joke”	(criticisms	
representing	both	positive	and	negative	face	impoliteness	–	positive	face,	as	criticisms	indicate	
disapproval	for	that	which	has	triggered	the	criticism,	and	negative	face	as	they	imply	that	such	
behaviour	should	not	be	repeated).	She	further	offends	him	when	she	instructs	the	jailer,	Mord,	to	
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take	him	to	a	smaller	cell	with	a	steeper	floor	(the	implied	threat	being	that	he	will	likely	fall	to	his	
death	from	a	smaller,	steeper-floored	sky	cell	shows	further	positive	face	attacks	on	Tyrion	by	Lyssa.	
These,	however,	as	less	likely	to	be	deemed	humorous).	
	
Although,	as	fans	of	the	show	will	know,	we	still	don’t	know	what	happened	when	Tyrion	took	a	
Jackass	and	a	Honeycomb	into	the	brothel.	Such	linguistic	behaviour,	evidently	offending	the	
character	of	Lyssa	Arryn,	clearly	entertained	the	TV	watching	audience	who	found	Tyrion’s	
confessions	hilarious	–	much	has	been	written	online	by	tens	of	thousands	of	fans	of	the	character	
and	the	show.	Beyond	being	merely	entertaining,	however,	we	should	note	that	as	with	our	
observations	on	the	process	of	characterisation	made	earlier	regarding	Elizabeth	Bennett,	such	
impoliteness	used	for	humorous	purposes	acts	as	evidence	of	Tyrion	having	a	cunning,	clever,	and	
sarcastic	mind	–	thereby	adding	to	the	broadening	arguments	for	impoliteness	and	humour	as	being	
characterisation	traits	(cf.	Culpeper	2001).	
	
A	perennial	debate	around	the	stylistic	analyses	of	humor	and,	one	imagines,	around	the	linguistic	
analysis	of	humor	more	generally,	is	the	relationship	between	formal	patterns	in	text	and	the	
capacity	of	these	patterns	to	induce	a	humorous	reaction	in	readers,	viewers	or	listeners.	In	other	
words,	what	kind	of	constituency	separates	readers	who	draw	a	humorous	reading	from	a	particular	
literary	text	from	those	who	do	not?	Clearly,	stylistics	can	here	draw	much	from	social	science	
research	and	especially	from	empirical	work	on	reading	strategies	and	on	reader	response	patterns.	
Related	to	this,	and	as	suggested	earlier	in	this	chapter,	some	parodies	and	satirical	texts	draw	much	
impetus	from	specific	cultural	reference	points,	but	over	time,	these	reference	points	become	
dislocated	or	invisible	to	a	contemporary	readership,	bringing	about	what	Nash	has	called	‘instances	
of	red-hot	topicality	gone	stone-cold’	(Nash	185:	xii).	Moreover,	there	are	even	questions	regarding	
the	comedic	status	of	texts	in	their	original	period	of	production.	Bex	has	called	into	question	the	
assumption	among	many	contemporary	analysts	that	(all)	eighteenth	century	satires	were	designed	
to	be	funny	(Bex	2006).	Probing	other	aspects	of	Jonathan	Swift’s	writing	(including	the	writer’s	own	
reflections	on	his	technique),	Bex	argues	that	there	is	nothing	comic	in	the	style	of	the	‘Proposal’;	
rather,	the	bitterness	and	savagery	in	Swift’s	satire	might,	at	best,	induce	‘a	despairing	sneer’	(Bex	
2006:	119-120).		
Other	challenges	for	the	stylistic	analysis	of	humor	include	the	development	of	a	theoretically	more	
‘joined	up’	approach	to	the	relationship	between	comic	writing	and	other	genres	of	discourse;	
especially	genres	of	discourse	that	comprise	or	embrace	certain	types	of	stylistic	incongruity.	The	
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language	of	both	Surrealism	and	the	Absurd	are	cases	in	point,	although	recent	ground-breaking	
accounts	of	these	two	genres	by,	respectively,	Stockwell	(forthcoming)	and	Gavins	(2013),	go	a	long	
way	to	isolating	the	key	features	of	language	and	discourse	that	could	enable	a	full	blown	account	of	
the	humor	mechanism	in	both	artistic	movements.	Another	challenge	for	stylistics	is	the	
development	of	better	corpus	tools	for	detecting	the	presence	of	potential	humour	inducing	
features	across	whole	swathes	of	text.	Again,	work	by	corpus	stylisticians	like	Mahlberg	(2013),	
which	charts	recurring	typologies	in	style	across	the	entire	output	of	the	novelist	Charles	Dickens,	
offers	the	opportunity	to	circumvent	localised	or	ad	hoc	commentary	about	humor	in	favour	of	a	
compelling	descriptions	of	humorous	techniques	across	all	of	a	writer’s	work.	Although	no	more	
than	a	snapshot	of	a	blossoming	area	of	inquiry,	the	present	chapter	has	sought	nonetheless	to	
demonstrate	both	how	techniques	in	stylistics	are	well	suited	to	the	exploration	of	verbal	humor	and	
why	stylisticians	have	shown	a	continued	interested	over	the	years	in	this	area	of	study.		
		
